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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JOHN D. MARSHALL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND 
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7407 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below, 
plaintiff and defendant. All italics are ours. 
The first trial of this case was before the Honorable 
John A. Hendricks, sitting with a jury, and the trial started 
July 1, 1948. This trial resulted in a verdict in favor of 
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the plaintiff and against the defendant awarding the plain-
tiff $500.00 special damages and $8,000.00 general damages 
( R. 17 4, 17 5) . Thereafter defendant filed its motion for 
a new trial setting forth all the statutory grounds (R. 037), 
which motion was on August 28, 1948, granted by the 
I 
court (R. 038). A second trial before the Honorable L. 
Leland Larsen, sitting with a jury, was had beginning 
February 23, 1949, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the l 
defendant and against the plaintiff "no cause of action" 
( R. 07 4) . The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for a 
new trial, which was denied April 22, 1949 (R. 144). _,1 
The plaintiff has assigned as error the court's grant-
ing defendant's motion for a new trial following the first 
trial of the case, and has assigned as error the granting 
and the refusal of certain instructions at the second trial. 
It therefore seems advisable, inasmuch as respondent does 
not agree with the appellant's statement of facts, to make 
a separate statement of facts as to each trial. 
B. STATEMENT OF F~CTS (FIRST TRIAL) 
All references to the record are to the transcript of 
the testimony of the first trial unless otherwise indicated. 
In granting defendant's motion for a new trial the 
Honorable John A. Hendricks made and entered the fol-
lowing written order : 
"After studying the affidavits and transcribed 
testimony of the plaintiff, and taking into consider-
ation the emphasis that plaintiff's counsel put on the 
defendant's (sic) confinement for two weeks in the 
hospital, the court is of the opinion that the jury 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
was influenced to the extent that they undoubtedly 
allowed excessive special damages, and also probably 
caused to a'ward general damages in excess of what 
they would have awarded had they known the facts 
about his stay in the hospital in May. It is there-
fore ordered that a new trial be granted." 
(R. 038) 
The language of the above quoted order does not 
in itself entirely suggest the harm to the defendant and the 
injustice perpetrated upon the court and jury alike by the 
matters therein referred to. 
Plaintiff in his complaint sought damages in the sum 
of $30,000.00, alleging that since the 19th day of June, 1947 
he had been constantly under the care of doctors, and al-
leged on information and belief that he had been permanent-
ly injured (R. 004) The jury was fully advised of plain-
tiff's claims in the instructions, not only as to the amount 
I 
demanded but the claimed permanency of plaintiff's in-
juries and the claimed loss of future earnings on account 
thereof (See Court's Instruction No. 11, R. 067). The facts 
disclosed that the accident occurred on the morning of June 
19, 1947, at about 9:00 A. M. at the passenger station at 
Ogden, Utah. Following the accident the plaintiff walked 
up town in Ogden to see a company doctor and after being 
hospitalized for two days returned to his home in Oakland, 
California (R. 15). Upon returning to his home he entered 
the Southern Pacific Railroad Company's hospital in San 
Francisco, where he was confined for one week and was an 
out patient an additional 37 days, or under treatment in 
San Francisco, a period of 44 days in all, being released 
about August 3, 1947 (R. 16). He then returned to his em-
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ployment as a chair car porter for the Southern Pacifi1 
Company and worked continuously until the 21st day o: 
May, 1948, during which time his monthly earnings wer1 
greater than they had been prior to the date of the acci 
dent. He testified that prior to the accident his earning! 
were- $218.00 per month plus tips, and after the accident hi! 
earnings were $230.00 a month plus tips (R. 35). ThE 
only qualification of the foregoing statement is plaintiff'! 
testimony that after he started back to work the fore par1 
of August and after he had made one round trip to Ogden, 
he went to the hospital for one heat treatment of one hour 
(R. 18). 
With respect to plaintiff's hospitalization in May, 1948, 
he testified on direct examination as follows: 
Q. Now, have you missed any work since going 
back to work the second time? (The "second time" 
refers to the one hour heat treatment he took after 
having started back to work.) 
A. Yes. I missed a couple of weeks here not 
long ago. I was in the hospital on the 25th of last 
month. 
Q. That would be May 25th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long were you in the hospital on that 
occasion? · 
A. Two weeks. 
Q. Were you continuously in the hospital dur-
ing that two weeks ? 
A. Yes, I was in there for two weeks. 
Q. Were you an "out" patient or in there all 
that time? 
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A. In the hospital-no-no out patient. 
~,- Q. What were you in the hospital for, Mr. 
,~ t 
.. 
~~ 
Marshall? 
A. My injury. 
Q. The condition of your back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you receiving treatments of any kind 
during that two weeks? 
A. Well, I was taking the same treatments. 
Q. Those heating-pad treatments? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were not, of course, able to work dur-
ing that two weeks? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. Now, in addition to that two weeks have 
you missed any other work? 
A. No, I didn't miss any other. 
(R. 19) 
On cross-examination he testified as follows: 
Q. Mr. Marshall, you told Mr. Black that re-
cently you were in the hospital? 
A. Yes, sir ; I were. 
Q. And when was that? 
A. On May 25th. 
Q. Of this year ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what hospital were you in? 
A. S. P. Hospital. 
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Q. VVhereabouts? 
A. General Hospital, in San Francisco. 
Q. And who was the doctor that was attendiDJ 
you at that time? 
A. Dr. Merritt. 
MR. BLACK : Will you spell that? 
A. Dr. M-e-r-r-i-t-t. 
Q. I think you told us that you were ther1 
continuously during the period of two weeks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were in bed? 
A. I was in bed._ 
Q. And since that time you have been work. 
ing on your job? 
A. Yes, sir, I have. 
Q. That is, the only time you have lost sinCE 
the time you went back to work in the beginning oj 
August has been these two weeks that you werE 
in the hospital; is that right? 
A. That is true. 
(R. 23, 24) 
We would like to call the court~s attention to the fac1 
that this testimony places the plaintiff in hospital con-
finement and in bed for a period of two weeks withill 
four weeks of the time the trial was held in Ogden Jul, 
1, 1948. Following the first trial and in support of defend· 
ant's motion for a new trial, defendant's counsel filed hi! 
affidavit and that of Dr. Russell J. Merritt, in which it wa1 
set forth that the facts were not as testified to by thE 
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plaintiff, but in fact, showed that the plaintiff had entered 
the Southern Pacific Hospital on May 21, 1948 and was 
there for a period of six days and during such time was 
fully ambulatory, up and around the hospital at will, and 
able to walk without any limp or list (R. 2nd Trial p. 151, 
152, 153, 15-1). The plaintiff filed a so-called counter-
affidavit in which he admitted the fact that he was only in 
the hospital from May 21 to May 27, and admitted that he 
was not "right down in bed," as he had testified, during his 
hospitalization (R. 2nd Trial p. 155, 156). At the second 
trial the plaintiff testified under oath on direct examina-
tion in conformity with the charge made by counsel for the 
defendant in his affidavit and the affidavit of Dr. Merritt 
on motion for a new trial, as follows: 
Q. Did you report back to the hospital? 
A. I did in May, 1948. 
Q. Did you remain at the hospital continuous-
ly for any period of time in May of 1948? 
A. For six days. 
Q. You testified at the previous hearing, didn't 
you, Mr. Marshall? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did you say at that time about the 
time you were in the hospital? 
~ · A. I said two weeks, but I was mistaken. It 
seemed like a long time to me. I didn't count the 
days. 
Q. Did you check after the previous hearing to 
see how long you had actually been . in the hospital? 
A. I did. 
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Q. And after checking you discovered it was 
six days? 
A. Six days. 
(R. 26, 2nd Trial) 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS (SECOND TRIAL) 
We think the statement of facts by appellant with 
respect to the second trial so far as it goes is not inaccurate; 
but in order for the court to properly consider the assign-
ments of error made by plaintiff with respect to the second 
trial we deem it necessary to supplement appellant's state-
ment of facts as we consider it incomplete, particularly with 
reference to the defendant's evidence. 
Defendant's witness LeRoy Miller, who was the trac-
tor operator, testified that he was moving south on the 
platform pulling one baggage truck with the small gasoline 
tractor shown in the photograph admitted in evidence and 
contained in the record at Page 088. There was no load on 
the baggage truck except one or two trash boxes as Miller's 
part in servicing the train was to put trash boxes on the 
various coaches. That as he came up to the point where the 
plaintiff Marshall was standing he stopped the tractor 
and asked the plaintiff to step out away from the cars; 
that Marshall did not move from his position, but said: 
"Come on boy, you got plenty of room"; that as he said this 
he made a motion with his hands and Miller then said: "0. K. 
watch out it might hit you" (R. 106, 109). That when he 
started up the tractor was only two or three feet from 
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Marshall (R. 113, 114). That it was customary for porters 
standing by car steps with the step box down, to pick it up 
and move over to the middle of the platform when a motor 
and baggage truck proceeded along the platform by the 
train (R. 109). That he was watching the plaintiff and 
endeavoring to pull by him without hitting him with the 
tractor or the wagon when the left front corner of the 
wagon caught the right rear corner of the standing truck 
(R. 110); that when this happened the rear end of the truck 
which was being pulled skidded to the right, the right 
corner thereof striking the coach. That Marshall could have 
taken one step and been in between the ends of the cars 
and in the clear but that he did not do so (R. 113, 118). 
The defendant's witness Kenneth Malan, aged 22, testi-
fied that he was washing windows on Marshall's car and 
was working five or six feet south of where plaintiff was 
standing; that he was using a long-handled brush, to 
which was attached a l/2 inch hose, water passing through 
the handle of the brush, the hose trailing behind him on the 
platform (R. 92, 100). That these small tractors when pull-
ing iron-tired baggage trucks along the cement platform 
make a lot of noise (R. 103, 104), and that he heard the 
tractor coming down the platform. That the tractor stopped 
when it was only two or three feet from where the plain-
tiff Marshall was standing (R. 93, 94). That when Miller 
stopped the tractor he stepped off and moved the water 
hose out of the way. Malan also stopped work to help move 
the hose out of the way so, as he testified, "the tractor 
would not run over it, because wheels cut the hose and 
break it" ( R. 93) . That before Miller started the tractor 
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up again he heard Miller and plaintiff talking; that he 
could not remember all of the conversation but saw the 
plaintiff step back and say something about there being 
plenty of room (R. 95). That Miller then started up the 
tractor and the two trucks cornered immediately ( R. 93, 94, 
95). That the tractor moved only about five feet from the 
time it started up until the two trucks cornered (R. 99). 
Louis Stegge, a carman, was inspecting the train and 
was on the platform a short distance north of where Mar-
shall was standing when the tractor passed him. He testi-
fied that the tractor came to a stop and when it stopped 
that he, Stegge, was then about two feet behind the back 
end of the baggage truck, which would place him nine or 
ten feet behind Miller, who was sitting on the tractor. He 
also testified that he was about four or five feet behind the 
truck when it stopped, which would place him about twenty 
feet from Miller, who was sitting on the tractor (R. 126). 
That he heard some conversation between the plaintiff 
Marshall and Miller, the tractor operator, which he did 
not understand, but he saw the plaintiff "move his hand for 
him to come on" (R. 123). That Miller then started up the 
tractor and had moved only four or five feet when the two 
trucks cornered (R. 124). That the truck being pulled had 
flat iron tires on the wheels four or five inches in width; 
that they were smooth and that the platform is smooth; 
that the tractor pulling a baggage truck with flat iron tires 
makes "plenty of racket" coming along the cement platform 
(R. 124). That the usual and customary practice among 
porters in the long time he has observed them while working 
around the depot platform at Ogden is to pick up the step 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
box and step away from the train when tractors and trucks 
move along the platform in servicing the train (R. 128). 
In presenting respondent's brief to the court we are 
content to limit our argument to the points discussed by 
appell,ant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court exercised a sound and just dis-
cretion in granting defendant's motion for a new trial. 
(a) The defendant was not guilty of "lack 
of due diligence" in failing to present the newly dis-
covered evidence at the first trial; 
(b) Such evidence was material and of such a 
nature as might change the outcome of the trial; 
(c) Such evidence was not merely impeaching 
evidence but was substantive evidence upon a mater-
ial issue in the case. 
II. The court committed no prejudicial error in grant-
ing defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7 in view of the 
evidence in the case. 
III. The evidence warranted the submission of the 
issue of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff to the 
jury. 
IV. There was no basis in the pleadings or evidence 
warranting the submission of the case to the jury on the 
theory of last clear chance and no error was committed by the 
court in refusing plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3 
thereon. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISE~ A SOUND AND 
JUST DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
(a) The defendant was not guilty of "lack 
of due diligence" in failing to present the newly dis-
covered evidence prior to the trial. 
It is a fact and the transcript of the proceedings at the 
first trial so show (R. 103), that on May 15, 1948, Mr. 
Bronson, counsel for the defendant, was present in the 
office of Mr. Clifton Hildebrand, an attorney in Oakland, 
California, and attended the taking of the deposition of one 
Dr. Lloyd D. Fisher. Dr. Fisher was a witness for the plain-
tiff and, as disclosed by the record, had examined the plain-
tiff the preceding December for the purpose of enabling him 
to testify. The deposition shows that the plaintiff was sent 
to Dr. Fisher by his Oakland attorneys; that Dr. Fisher did 
not examine him for the purpose of treating him, did not 
prescribe for or treat him, but saw him on one occasion on 
December 20, 1947 (R. 105, 110, 111). The affidavit of Mr. 
Bronson in support of the motion for a new trial (R. 153, 
2nd Trial) set forth the fact that he had, as of May 15,·1948, 
fully investigated in San Francisco and found that there 
had been no hospitalization of the plaintiff since August of 
1947. The record fully discloses that the plaintiff had not 
been hospitalized between the first part of August, 1947 and 
the 21st day of May, 1948-six days after defendant's coun- J 
sel was in Oakland and San Francisco investigating the 
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facts of plaintiff's hospitalization. We would like at this 
point to call the court's attention to the fact that the case 
was then set for trial at Ogden, Utah, May 26, 1948. The 
plaintiff having worked continuously from the beginning 
of August, 1947 until May 15, 1948, the date defendant's 
counsel investigated the matter of plaintiff's hospitalization, 
and not having been hospitalized or received any medical 
treatment during that period of time, we submit that it was 
not reasonable for counsel to expect that between that date, 
viz, May 15, 1948, and the date of trial, May 26, 1948, the 
plaintiff would require hospitalization on, account of his 
alleged injuries. The plaintiff went to the Southern Pacific 
Hospital in San Francisco complaining of his back six days 
after Mr. Bronson was in Oakland to take the aforesaid depo-
sition and five days before the case was set for trial. In 
view of the distance between Salt Lake City and San Fran-
cisco, we think that we were diligently trying to properly 
take care of this lawsuit. We cannot, of course, discuss the 
merits of the conflicting affidavits filed by counsel for the 
plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff's counsel stating that he 
advised Mr. Bronson of the hospitalization of the plaintiff 
before trial, and defendant's counsel denying this. As plain-
tiff's counsel in his brief states, "It was within the discre-
tion of the trial court to determine the facts as revealed by 
the affidavits." 
At page 34 of appellant's brief counsel says: "If coun-
sel considered the hospitalization issue to be so vital to his 
case why didn't he make a telephone call during or before 
the trial? Why didn't he bring this matter to the attention 
of the trial court? Why didn't he move for a continuance? 
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Why should plaintiff be saddled with the onerous burden of 
a new trial because of opposing counsel's inattention to his 
case?" The simple answer to this is that while counsel for 
the defendant was surprised at the plaintiff's testimony 
that he had been in the hospital flat on his back in bed for 
a period of two weeks between May 15th-the time counsel 
was in San Francisco-and July 1, the date of the trial, de-
fendant's counsel did not know and had no reason to suspect 
that the plaintiff was falsifying about the matter. If we 
correctly understand plaintiff's counsel, he contends that 
this was inexcusable gullibility on the part of defendant's 
counsel; that defendants counsel should have known or sus-
pected the testimony was false, and should have made such 
an investigation in San Francisco, California before the 
close of the trial, which consumed less than two days, as 
would enable defendant's counsel to either prove the falsity 
of plaintiff's testimony or move the court for a continuance. 
We invite the court's attention to the cases of Rath v. 
Bankston, 281 P. 1081, and Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 P. 
970, cited and discussed by appellant's counsel at page 32 of 
their brief. These cases are cited in support of what seems 
to be an argument to the effect that a "litigant at the trial 
must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and 
there." Counsel seems to advance the astounding proposi-
tion that perjury is permissible if you can get away with 
it, that is, if counsel on the other side does not catch you in 
it then and there, and be prepared to rise up and expose it, 
and that unless it is exposed at the trial in which it occurs 
the trial court must permit the verdict to stand even though 
it was secured or may have been secured by false testimony, 
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and that neither courts nor jurors nor litigants can find 
protection from such an injustice by way of a new trial. 
The cases above referred to and discussed on page 32' of 
appellant's brief are not only not in point but they do not hold 
what counsel says in his brief, at page 32, they stand for. 
In the Rath case, which was an action for damages for per-
sonal injuries, it had been testified that it was impossible 
to back a truck and trailer up to a certain curb. The trial 
was recessed and during the recess the plaintiff conducted 
an experiment with a truck and trailer similar to those in-
volved in the accident and determined that it was possible 
to back the truck and trailer to the curb at the point in ques-
tion. The next day the trial was resumed but the plaintiff 
did not put on this contradictory evidence although she had 
a full opportunity to do so. It was held that this was not 
newly discovered evidence entitling the plaintiff to a new 
trial after an adverse verdict, for the simple reason that 
the plaintiff had the evidence in her hands before the close 
of the trial and full opportunity to present it. 
In the Cohn case, which appellant herein cites for the 
proposition which appellant himself italicizes as follows: 
"A litigant at the trial must be prepared to meet and ex-
pose perjury then and there," suit was brought by way 
of collateral attack upon a decree which had been obtained 
by the prevailing party bribing a witness to perjure himself. 
The decree had become final following appeal to the Supreme 
Court of California. The following is what the court said 
and what it held : 
"The trial is his (the litigant's) opportunity for 
making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, 
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being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he 
likewise fails to show the injustice that has been 
done him, on motion for a new trial, and the judg-
ment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. 
The wrong in such case, is, of course, a most grievous 
one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts 
would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised 
that would remedy the evil without producing mis-
chiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. End-
less litigation, in which nothing was ever finally 
determined, would be worse than occasional mis-
carriages of justice; and so the rule is that a final 
judgment cannot be annulled merely because it can 
be shown to have been based on perjured testimony; 
for, if this could be done once, it could pe done again 
and again, ad infinitum." 
We submit that these cases relied upon by plaintiff's 
counsel are not only not inconsistent with the position of 
the defendant in this case, but support defendant's position. 
(b) That the true facts with relation to plaintiff's 
stay in the hospital as well as the time he was in the hos-
pital was material and of such a nature as would probably 
change the outcome of the trial cannot be doubted. It was 
of the utmost importance in this trial to ascertain exactly 
what the facts were with respect to any hospitalization 
occurring just before the trial and nearly a year after the 
accident, during which time plaintiff had never lost a day's 
time from his work and earned more money per month than 
before the accident. The importance of learning the true 
facts was due to the fact that plaintiff was claiming that 
he was permanently injured and was seeking damages in 
the sum of $30,000.00 therefor. The importance to a jury 
of a plaintiff being compelled to submit to an extensive 
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hospitalization and medical treatment nearly a year after 
the accident cannot be overemphasized. Any reasonable 
man would be much more inclined to believe that the plain-
tiff's injuries were permanent if nearly a year after the 
accident he was compelled to enter a hospital where he was 
confined to his bed undergoing medical treatment, as plain-
tiff testified to, than if the true facts were made known, 
viz, that the plaintiff went to the hospital for a checkup a 
few days before the trial, was in' the hospital for a period 
of six days, and was fully ambulatory during that time. 
Plaintiff's counsel considered it of great importance and 
the trial court in his order granting defendant's motion for 
a new trial stated that he was taking "into consideration 
the emphasis that plaintiff's counsel put on the plaintiff's 
confinement for two weeks in the hospital." Whether it 
was intentional or otherwise is immaterial in a proceeding 
of this kind; the fact remains that the plaintiff himself 
falsified on this important matter at the· first trial. He 
admitted he falsified by the so-called counter-affidavit filed 
in opposition to defendant's motion for a new trial. In his 
testimony at the second trial, as set forth in the statement 
of facts herein, he again admitted he falsified on this matter 
at the first trial. The injury and the injustice to the de-
fendant is the same whether the false testimony was given 
intentionally or unintentionally. We further submit that 
the evidence was of such materiality that the trial court in 
the exercise of its discretion was warranted in assuming 
that it would probably change the outcome of another trial, 
and it may be that the fact that the outcome of the new 
trial was changed is some indication of the materiality of 
the evidence in question. 
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(c) The evidence which the defendant offered to show 
at a new trial, if granted, was not, as is contended by plain-
tiff's counsel, solely for the purpose of impeaching the 
plaintiff. It of course would necessarily have the effect 
of impeaching the plaintiff but it had the other character-
istic of substantive evidence on a material matter. At the 
second trial the very thing defendant's counsel said he 
would prove, if given a new trial, was proved and it was 
proved out of the mouth of the plaintiff himself upon his 
direct examination by his counsel. (See Statement of Facts, 
supra.) 
We concede the general rules with relation to motions 
for new trials cited by counsel, viz, that a new trial should 
not be granted on the grounds of newly discovered evidence 
if such evidence merely goes to impeach a witness, and that 
a new trial should not be granted in the exercise of a sound 
discretion unless there is some reasonable basis for suppos-
ing that the newly discovered evidence will change the out-
come. But the newly discovered evidence in this case was 
substantive evidence upon a material point in addition to j·,. 
being impeaching evidence. At the second trial, antici- . 
pating counsel for the · defendant would be prepared to 
establish the true facts with relation to the plaintiff's hos-
pitalization, plaintiff's counsel brought out the facts as a 
part of his main case during his direct examination of the 
plaintiff. We do not see how he can now contend that the 
evidence was merely impeaching evidence. We submit that 
the court under all the circumstances was acting well within 
its discretion in holding that the· defendant's counsel had 
not been guilty of lack of due diligence; that the evidence :~ 
'~ , 
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was material and such as would probably alter the outcome 
of another trial. 
It appears from all the evidence in the case that the 
plaintiff lost a total of 50 days on account of this accident, 
44 days immediately following the accident in 1947, and 6 
days the latter part of May, 1948. The jury awarded him 
$500.00 special damages, which was substantially in ex-
cess of what he lost in wages in accordance with the true 
facts. At the second trial Marshall testified on cross as 
follows: 
Q. And then you were an out patient for an 
additional time and the total time was 44 days? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't draw any money during that 
time? 
A. I did not. 
Q. How much would your wages amount to for 
that period? 
A. 44 days. $350.00 
An additional six days time would not bring his lost 
wages up to as much as $400.00. In view of the nature of 
the injury plaintiff actually suffered and the time he lost, 
the trial court undoubtedly considered that awarding the 
plaintiff general damages in the sum of $8,000.00 was ex-
cessive and was perhaps greatly influenced by the fact 
that the jury most likely considered the plaintiff to have 
rather serious permanent injuries because of their belief 
that he was in a hospital flat on his back for two weeks 
nearly a year after the accident. Under the circumstances, 
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it is easy to believe that the trial judge felt that he could 
not effect justice in the case by reducing the verdict inas-
much as the entire case was tainted and affected by the 
false testimony given. 
It was a matter largely within the discretion of the 
trial court as to whether or not he would grant a new trial 
in this case. It is now for this court simply a question of 
law as to whether or not the trial court abused that dis-
cretion and the burden is upon the appellant in this case to 
clearly establish that the trial court did abuse its discre-
tion. This court has on several recent occasions had this 
question before it for review. In the case of Moser v. Zion's 
Co-op. Mercantile lnst., - Utah -, 197 P. (2) 136, 
Mr. Justice Wolfe reviewed most of the early Utah cases 
treating the subject and said: 
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit of 
any serious dispute that the question of granting 
or denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. White v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; 
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 
P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Livingston, 69 
Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bown Live 
Stock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. Logan 
City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule applies 
whether the motion is based upon insufficiency of 
the evidence or upon newly discovered evidence. 
See cases above cited and Valiotis v. Utah-Apex 
Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Greco v. Gen-
tile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; and Trimble v. 
Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674. 
This court cannot substitute its discretion for that 
of the trial court. James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 
117 P. 1068, 2 N. C. C. A. 782. We do not ordinarily 
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interfere with rulings of the trial court in either 
granting or denying a motion for new trial, and un-
less abuse of, or failure to exercise, discretion on the 
part of the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the 
ruling of the trial judge will be sustained. Lehi 
Irrigation Co. v. Moyle, et al., 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; 
White v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State 
Bank v. Livingston, supra; Clark v. Los Angeles 
& S. L. R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 2.75 P. 582; and Trimble 
v. Union Pacific Stages, supra. See also Harrison 
v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 161, 47 P. 1019, 
1020." 
The Moser case was followed later by State v. Cooper, 
-Utah-, 201 P. (2) 764, without additional discussion 
of the question. 
The latest decision of this court upon the matter is the 
case of Dwight L. King, Administrator of the Estate of 
Wendell 0. Jorgensen, Deceased, v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, decided as recently as December 13, 1949, in which 
the general principles relating to the granting of new trials 
was again reviewed by Mr. Justice Wolfe. Any further re-
search or discussion of the law applicable to the question 
here involved would be superfluous. 
POINT II 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN 
GRANTING DEFENUANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 7 IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
IN THE CASE. 
Appellant concedes that defendant's Requested In-
struction No. 7 is a correct abstract statement of the law, 
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but that the giving thereof was not warranted by the evi-
dence in the case. The usual and customary practice, ac-
cording to the testimony of the witness Louis Stegge, who 
had for a long time worked on the platform at Ogden, Utah, 
was for porters to pick up their step box and step over to 
the center of the platform where they would be in line 
with the steel posts holding up the umbrella sheds when 
tractors pulling baggage trucks came moving along the side 
of the train ( R. 120) . The tractor operator, LeRoy Miller, 
who had been operating a tractor on this platform for three 
and a half years likewise testified that such was the usual 
custom and practice of chair car porters (R. 109). It does 
not appear from the evidence that the reason Miller stopped 
the tractor was because Marshall was standing by the coach, 
but because he did not want to run over the water hose. 
However, before he started up he testified that he asked 
Marshall to step· out away from the cars, which in and by 
itself indicates that it was the usu3:l and customary thing 
to be done and that Miller expected it of Marshall. Instead 
of stepping out, Marshall said: "Come on boy, you got 
plenty of room," and made a motion for Miller to come 
ahead (R. 106, 109, 123). Miller himself had certain duties 
to perform in connection with the servicing of the train, 
viz, to get the trash boxes on the cars, and so he then pro-
ceeded to pull forward approximately five feet before the 
trucks cornered. It is quite obvious that 1What Miller en-
deavored to do when he saw that Marshall, even after being 
requested, was not going to move from his position, was to 
pull to the left in an effort to give Marshall as much clear-
ance as possible, and it was this action on his part that un-
doubtedly caused the trucks to corner. Miller testified that 
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he was watching the plaintiff endeavoring to pull by him 
without hitting him with the tractor or the wagon at the 
time the left front corner of the truck caught the right rear 
corner of the standing truck (R. 110). It is thus apparent 
that Marshall could have taken three steps forward and 
been absolutely in the clear or he could have easily stepped 
on his step box and onto the first step of his coach and 
likewise have been in the clear. 
In view of the testimony with respect to the custom 
and practice of porters moving out a way from the train 
when tractors and trucks came along, which was something 
the jury had a right to believe, as well as the fact that it 
would appear from the physical facts alone that there was 
some danger in standing between the coach and a moving 
tractor and trailer, we think the instruction was warranted. 
Appellant says that the only danger in standing against 
the car would be in the event that the tractor operator 
was negligent. The custom and practice did not so indicate 
nor do the physical facts so indicate. Appellant's statement 
is not a fair statement for the reason that accidents some-
times happen without negligence on the part of anyone. 
Nor is it a conclusive answer in this case for the reason 
that as this is not an Employer's Liability case contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff is a complete bar to recovery. 
Plaintiff had worked as a chair car porter for a consider-
able time and he knew, or he should have known, that there 
was some danger attendant to his maintaining his standing 
position against the car and that he would be in an absolute-
ly safe position if he took three steps, which would carry 
him to the center of the platform. This was not a case where 
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the tractor was moving and the plaintiff would have to jump 
for it, as the tractor was standing still and before it was 
started up he was requested by Miller to move and undoubt-
edly had plenty of time and full opportunity to do so. If the 
instruction is carefully read in the light of the foregoing 
we think it will be made clear that it was properly given. 
The instruction is a fair and accurate statement of the law 
-not slanted in defendant's favor in the least, actually 
amounts to no more than a detailed instruction on contri-
butory negligence, and cannot therefore have been pre-
judicial in any event for the reason that the contributory 
negligence of the defendant was an issue which was proper-
ly submitted to the jury. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE W AR~ANTED THE COURT'S 
SUBMISSION OF THE ISSUE OF THE CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO 
THE JURY. 
Much of what was said in the argument under Point 
II has a bearing upon the question of the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence. In arguing this matter to the court, 
appellant's counsel again falls into the error of saying: 
"Furthermore, Marshall was entitled to assume that Miller 
would operate the jitney and truck in a careful and prudent 
manner. Marshall was under no obligation to anticipate 
that Miller would be negligent in operating the vehicle." 
This may well be true, but in view of the custom and prac-
tice of porters moving away from the train when tractors 
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and trucks are passing, together with what seems to be an 
inherently dangerous thing, i. e .• to stand between a coach 
and a moving tractor and truck when it is not at all necessary 
to do so, Marshall should have known that an accident might 
happen or that he might in some way be injured by stand-
ing against the coach, even though Miller was himself not 
negligent in moving the vehicle. The undisputed testimony 
was that these gasoline tractors when pulling an iron-tired 
baggage truck on a cement platform make a lot of racket. 
The window washer, Kenneth Malan, heard the tractor 
coming a considerable distance away. Even if the plaintiff's 
testimony that he never saw the tractor and truck or heard 
it until it was just even with him, incredible as this seems, 
is to be believed, it would be sufficient to raise the ques-
tion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
in not seeing and hearing what he should have seen and 
heard. 
The jury in this case had a right to believe that the 
tractor stopped two or three feet from where Marshall was 
standing, as testified to by every witness in the case who 
saw the accident, excepting the plaintiff himself, and had 
the further right to believe the testimony that before it was 
again started up Miller, the tractor operator, asked Mar-
shall to move; that Marshall refused to move and instead 
said: "Come on boy, you got plenty of room," at the same 
time motioning Miller to come ahead. There can be no ques-
tion but there was at least two, and possibly three, places 
Marshall could have stepped to where he would be absolutely 
safe--the center of the platform, the car steps, or between 
the cars-and that he had ample time to do so. There was 
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ample evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, 
entitled them to believe that the plaintiff was guilty of 
negligence proximately contributing to the accident, which~ 
would bar recovery, and they were entitled to an instruc-
tion on contributory negligence and the court committed no 
prejudicial error in giying the same. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE OR 
PLEADINGS WARRANTING THE SUBMISSION 
OF THE CASE TO THE JUR.Y ON THE THEORY 
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND NO ERROR WAS 
COMMIT·TED BY THE COURT IN REFUSING 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
THEREON. 
We have no quarrel with plaintiff's statement and 
definition of the doctrine of last clear chance, or with the 
cases cited in support thereof. It is not necessary, however, 
to go back to the case of Davies v. Mann, as this court in the 
case of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, and on petition for 
rehearing at 109 Utah 365, has in an opinion by Mr. Justice 
Wolfe very clearly and in great detail set out the meaning 
and the manner of the application of this doctrine. Con-
sidering this question in the light of any given set of facts, 
however, it should be borne in mind, as was said in Thomas 
v. Sadlier, 108 Utah 552, 162 P. (2d) 112, that if the situa-
tion is such that to reasonable minds there is doubt as to 
whether the "second party" had time to avoid the accident, 
the matter should not be submitted to the jury, otherwise 
there is grave danger of permitting the one really at "fault 
L 
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to shift the blame for the accident on the other by the ac-
centuation of the other's duty to avoid the effect of the 
first one's negligence." I have borrowed the foregoing 
from Mr. Justice Wolfe's opinion on application for re-
hearing in the Graham case, supra. 
The question then is, at what point of time did the duty 
that Miller, the tractor operator, had to exercise ordinary 
care devolve upon him under the doctrine of last clear 
chance? According to plaintiff's position it was at any time 
that Miller observed the plaintiff standing against the 
coach where he had no business to be when a moving trac-
tor was approaching along the platform. On this phase of 
the case plaintiff's counsel admits and contends, as he must, 
that the plaintiff Marshall had negligently placed himself 
in a position of danger which he maintained up to the point 
of the accident. The question now is, what should Miller, the 
tractor operator, have done to discharge his duty? 
There is no evidence whatever in the record that Miller 
was required to stop or that it would be negligence merely 
for him to proceed past a porter who failed to step into the 
clear in violation of the usual and customary practice and 
procedure under the circumstances. For the purpose of 
argument, let us concede that Miller had the duty, as plain-
tiff contends, to exercise reasonable care t~ avoid striking 
the plaintiff as he stood against the car and that such duty 
arose as soon as Miller saw the plaintiff in a position poten-
tially hazardous. Assuming this, there is not one shred of 
testimony or evidence in the record to indicate that Miller 
was not exercising ordinary care to avoid striking the plain-
tiff. We are, of course adopting in this discussion what 
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seems to us the incredible testimony of the plaintiff that 
the first time he heard or saw or in any way observed the 
tractor was when it came past him at a speed faster than he 
could walk. If there is any basis at all for plaintiff's con-
tention that he was entitled to an instruction on the doctrine 
of last clear chance, it can only be on account of such testi-
mony. But if we accept plaintiff's testimony in this regard 
i 
the only thing in the evidence that might indicate the man-
ner in which Miller was driving the tractor that would throw 
any light on whether or not he was exercising ordinary care 
to avoid the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence, was 
the fact that he pulled farther to the left in an effort to 
clear the plaintiff as much as possible, and that he was 
pulling out to the left of what otherwise would have been 
his line of travel in an effort to avoid any possibility of in-
jury to the plaintiff. It was this effort on the part of Miller 
which resulted in the cornering of the two trucks. It can-
not be said that from and after the instant the trucks cor-
nered Miller had a last clear chance. The accident occurred 
at the moment the trucks cornered. As· was said in the 
Graham case, supra, "The opportunity to avoid the accident 
must not be a mere possibility, but a clear opportunity." 
From and after the instant the trucks cornered, Miller was 
powerless to avoid any further consequences. 
No jury would have been warranted in finding Miller 
negligent in the manner he operated the tractor along the 
platform, assuming again that they believed plainitiff's ver-
sion of the accident, either because of the speed plaintiff 
testified to or the fact that Miller did not stop. There was 
no evidence in the record whatsoever that the speed at which 
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plaintiff said the tractor was operated, or the failure to 
stop was negligence; and negligence from the speed and 
the failure to stop alone cannot in anywise be inferred. At 
any rate, the speed and the failure to stop was no evidence 
that Miller was not exercising due care to avoid the possibil-
ity of injury to the plaintiff occasioned by his own negli-
gence. Ordinary men-jurymen-are prone to conclude 
"after the event" that the conduct involved was negligent 
and to do so merely because an accident happened. It is a 
device that is "worked to death" by personal injury lawyers 
and trial courts should not, as was said in the Sadlier case, 
supra, shift the blame for the accident by submitting the 
issue of last clear chance, unless there is evidence of negli-
gent conduct shown. And the conclusion that there was a 
failure to exercise the care that a prudent person should 
to avoid the consequences of the other party's negligence, 
should be uninfluenced by the fact that an accident ·hap-
pened. 
The attempt to inject into this case the theory of "last 
clear chance" is strictly an afterthought on the part of 
plaintiff's counsel. Neither the plaintiff nor defendant 
tried this case upon any such theory. We will concede that 
if the parties proceed to try a case upon a certain theory 
that neither side should thereafter complain because it was 
not pleaded, nor for any other reason, but in this case it 
was simply a question as to whether plaintiff's theory as 
set forth in his complaint and on which he tried it was to 
be believed, in which case it was liability, or whether the 
jury was to believe the defendant's version as to how the 
accident happened, in which case it was not liability. _Let 
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us look at the complaint. The negligence charged in para-
graph IV was as follows : 
(a) That defendant failed to keep a proper 
lookout in operating the tractor; 
(b) That defendant operated the tractor at 
an excessive rate of speed; 
(c) That defendant failed to keep the tractor 
under safe, proper and immediate control. 
(R. 002) 
The plaintiff went through two trials and never dev-
iated from or enlarged upon the foregoing allegations of 
negligence. T'o this day no pleading or anything else can be 
found in the file indicating that the plaintiff entertained 
the theory or would urge that he was, on account of his own 
negligence, in a position of peril and oblivious thereto and 
the defendant was or should have been aware of the danger 
and should have, but failed to, exercise ordinary care to 
avoid- the consequences of plaintiff's negligence. But that 
is the theory that plaintiff's counsel now says the case should 
have been submitted to the jury on. 
The very first indication that plaintiff embraced such 
. theory was when following the trial he submitted the re-
quested instruction here at issue. The case was in such 
shape when it went to the jury that under the evidence and 
the instructions they were able to and undoubtedly did fully 
consider both the plaintiff's and defendant's version as to 
how the accident happened and returned a verdict accord-
ingly .. Plaintiff elected to and did try this case on the theory 
that the defendant was negligent and that he was free of 
contributory negligence. The defendant iried it on the theory 
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that it was not negligent and that the plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence, and the plaintiff was fully warned by the 
pleadings that such would be the defense. The plaintiff 
was not entitled under all the circumstances, without plead-
ings or warning of any kind, to attempt to "shift the blame 
for the accident on the defendant by accentuating defen-
dant's duty to avoid the effect of his own neglect." Thomas 
v. Sadlier, supra. We submit that no error was committed 
in failing to inject the issue of last clear chance into the case 
under all the circumstances, and if error was committed 
it was not prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the trial court committed 
no error and was exercising a sound, judicial discretion in 
granting defendant's motion for a new trial, and that no 
prejudicial error was committed in granting defendant's 
Requested Instructions No. 7 and No. 11, or in refusing 
plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
Counsel for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
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